McGeorge Law Review
Volume 32 | Issue 4

Article 3

1-1-2001

Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law
Martha Albertson Fineman
Cornell University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Martha A. Fineman, Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law, 32 McGeorge L. Rev. 1031 (2001).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/mlr/vol32/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
McGeorge Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.

Fatherhood, Feminism and Family Law
Martha Albertson Fineman*

I. LEGAL THEORY AND THE FAMILY
The language of the laws governing families in the United States is gender
neutral.' This is as true with the categories of "mother" and "father" as with the
categories of "husband" and "wife."2 One set of relationships is collapsed into
"parent," and the other into "spouse" or "partner." Certainly, one of the most
profound influences on this transformation to gender neutrality in family law was
the gender equality revolution mounted by feminist legal practitioners and
theorists in the latter part of the twentieth century.3 In reshaping the world into a
more egalitarian place (at least in aspiration), feminists were not primarily
focused on the workings of the average family. Most of their attention was drawn
to the gendered and exclusionary nature of public institutions, such as the
workplace. When intimate relationships came under feminist consideration, the
issues most likely to be explored were violence against women in the home and
6
from intimate partners (including sexual violence) 5 and reproductive rights,
rather than exploring how women's roles in intimate relationships served to
disadvantage them in the market.
Feminists generated public concern about sexual harassment in the
7
workplace and domestic (and other-gendered) violence, which altered
perceptions about sexuality and reproductive rights.' The family as an institution
in these discussions tended to be treated as subsidiary to the market or as a
bastion of male prerogative and privilege. 9 The family was either another

* Dorothea S. Clarke Professor of Feminist Jurisprudence. Cornell. B.A., 1971, Temple; J.D., 1975,
University of Chicago. This paper was presented on October 19, 2000, as part of McGeorge School of Law's
Distinguished Speaker series.
1. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF
DIVORCE REFORM, 1-13, 19-35 (1991) [hereinafter ILLUSION OF EQUALITY] (describing this phenomenon).
at 18-19 (describing divorce law changes).
2. See id.
at 26-28 (discussing the efforts and results of this movement).
3. See id.
4. Id.at21.
5. See generally ELIZABETH SCHNEIDER, BATrERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST LAWMAKING (2000)
(discussing the impact of domestic violence on legal reform).
6. The feminist movement surrounding reproductive rights focused on the rights of women to use birth
control. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1964).
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
7. See, e.g.,
105-06 (1987).
8. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN & ROXANNE MYKITIUK, THE PUBLIC NATURE OF PRIVATE
VIOLENCE, Preface, xii-xv (1994) (demonstrating these feminists' desire to draw attention to women's struggles

with the problems of harassment and gendered violence, as well as their desire to change the way it was treated
in society).
9. ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1,at 22-25.
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obstacle hindering full participation of women in the public sphere'" or an
arrangement that left women subjected to domination and victimization in the
private sphere."
Women's traditional, gendered roles within the family were considered
problematic primarily because they impeded realization of their role as equal
participants in the economic and political aspects of life.' 2 Family and family
roles, particularly that of mother, were often analyzed as oppressive and
impeding individual growth-and independence.'3 The family itself was often
alleged to often be violent and dangerous.' 4
One assumption manifest in this treatment of the family and its relationship
with other societal institutions was that family roles are malleable, easily recast
and reformed in ways that can facilitate women's equality in the public sphere.' 5
This is not the assumption in the public sphere where equality is not only
formally imposed, but also monitored.' 6 Laws structure relationships in the
workplace' 7 and mandate employers treat women equally." If there is
discrimination, remedies are provided by individual and governmental actions.' 9
However, the equality imposed in this context is sameness of treatment for
women-they are to be treated the same as men. 20 There is scant recognition that
women and men may have different experiences, responsibilities and family
demands' that require unequal treatment in order to achieve equality in end
10.

See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L.

REV. 2181, 2187 (1995) [hereinafter Masking Dependency] (discussing the cost of "intra-family dependency"

and its disproportionate impact on women).
11. Barrie Thorne, Feminist Rethinking of the Family, in RETHINKING THE FAMILY 7 (Barrie Thorne and
Marilyn Yalom eds., 1982).
12. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 35 (1995) [hereinafter NEUTERED MOTHER].
13. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Constitution of Civil Society D. the Family, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 531, 543-45 nn.87-88 (2000) (discussing criticism of the institution of marriage).
14. Id. at 544 & n.88. See generally Schneider, supra note 5 (discussing domestic violence).
15. See Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2208-09 (explaining that if the mother works someone
must be hired to care for the children).
16. The public sphere has not facilitated malleable gender roles as women are still predominant
caretakers and are privatized within the family. Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2208-09.
17. Anti-discrimination laws such as Title VII supposedly allow women to achieve on equal grounds;
anti-harassment laws are supposed to create a more comfortable workplace for women.
18. See, e.g., U.S.C.A. § 2000e-z (West 2001), unconstitutional as applied, Miller v. Bayview United
Methodist Church, Inc., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (2001).
19. State and federal law both contain anti-discrimination statutes to prevent discrimination against
women. An example in federal law is Title VII, enforced by the EEOC. An expansive state statute prohibiting
discrimination against women is the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD).
20. This sameness of treatment was a goal of the equality feminists; however, it does not take into
account the unique factors in women's situations, such as disproportionate responsibility for caretaking and
pregnancy. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 39-43 (discussing some of the problems inherent in
sameness of treatment models).
21. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and
Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 13, 20-22 (2000) [hereinafter Cracking the
Foundational Myths] (illustrating that the woman is normally the caretaker in the family and explaining the
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result." Workplaces are designed with the unencumbered worker in mind and the
law demands only that women be treated the same as the gendered icon of the
autonomous individual. 23 The solution offered by advocates of equality, of
course, is to complement and facilitate women's movement into the market with
men's movement into the nursery. This idealized resolution substitutes
androgynous individuality for differentiated, complementary roles within the
traditional family.
The norm in the family has also become one of equality--matching, at least
rhetorically, the expectations of the workplace. The family, however, retains its
private character: equality may be imposed in a formal manner--the rules are
gender neutral-but the monitoring and implementation of equality within the
2
family are left to the individual family and its members. Within the family,
powerful economic, cultural and social pressures continue to channel behavior
into traditional, not egalitarian modes.
The differences in the development and implementation of equality in the
family, as contrasted with the workplace, have wrought a world in which
caretakers (typically mothers, wives and daughters) are now free to compete with
unencumbered women and men in a workplace that remains basically unchanged
in its expectations for workers and fails to take competing family demands into
account.25 As a society, we remain relatively unresponsive to the contradictory
and conflicting demands placed on caretakers within families who also are in the
paid workforce.2 6 In fact, we indulge in the fiction of the modern, egalitarian
family in full operation in a transformed world of "ungendered" relationships.
Corresponding to the misconception of the gender neutral family is the
perception that the gender revolution has been successfully accomplished in the
workplace, at least in regard to the acceptance of equal opportunity and antidiscrimination norms. This misperception can only be maintained so long as
caretaking and its costs are hidden within the family, which allows the fiction of
a level playing field to flourish. Shorn of family dependency, individuals can be
27
expected to engage in unfettered competition. There are problems with these set

burden it places on them).
22. Id. at 26-27.
is
23. See Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2202 (noting that "the egalitarian aspiration
21.
at
21,
note
ensconced in law"); Crackingthe FoundationalMyths, supra
24. Id. at 2201 ("[Elarly reformers merely expected that fathers would perform more household duties as
modem mothers spent more time and energy on market endeavors. Under this view marital partners, fulfilling
egalitarian impulses, would simply rework their relationship into a nonhierarchical form.").
25. See id. at 2208 (noting that when both parents enter the workforce no one is available to care for the
children).
26. See Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2208-11 (describing these conflicting demands and the
resources to assist women with their dual roles); see also Martha McCluskey, Subsidized Lives and the
of
lack
our
Ideology of Efficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. at 115-28 (2000) (pointing out the faults in
responsibilities).
additional
their
and
women
accommodate
to
failing
system
economic
current
27. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, ch. 3, n.3 (illustrating male movement into the nursery); see
also Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2202 (reflecting on reformers' belief that "with the egalitarian
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assumptions for women and the workforce, but my focus in this article is the
effect that such perceptions have in the so-called private sphere of family law.
II. THE EGALITARIAN FAMILY
What we see in family law is that the imposition of an equality model on an
existing unequal distribution of labor and sacrifice actually results in equality
operating to further disadvantage women (and ill-serve children). 28 The
imposition of equality furthers inequality because it does not take into account
the consequences and costs of "mothering" for the caretaker. Not only is she
disabled in her now-expected competition in the workplace; she is disadvantaged
in the family sphere.29
Certainly, one casualty of the equality revolution has been the (relatively
recent) recognition given to the institution of motherhood in law.30 Recognition of
mothering or nurturing as something warranting special treatment or
consideration has been attacked by liberal legal feminists as well as by
policymakers, politicians and fathers' rights groups. Some policymakers,
politicians and father's advocates condemn special treatment because they wish
to restore the authority of the father in the family and fear that women are raising
children without appropriate paternal supervision and economic support.3 For
this group of equality advocates, the real goal is restoration of historic inequality.
For feminists, however, the distrust of special treatment for motherhood
often springs from their overarching commitment to equality for women. 32
Although feminist reform suggestions are seldom punitive in motive, they still
seem explicitly concerned with prospective social engineering in the direction of
equality. For example, one suggestion is that we not respond to economic need at
divorce by structuring property division rules or granting alimony to respond to
the social problem of economically dependent wives and mothers. 33 Equal
treatment is equated with equal economic responsibility, considered so important
a goal by reform feminists, that it should be the focus of legal reform even if it
produces harsh results for poor women at divorce.34 Another example of this
equality fetish in family law is the endorsement, by many legal feminists, of a
aspiration ensconced in law, women would be freed to develop their careers and men would be unconstrained in
choosing nurturing over other endeavors").
28. Cracking the FoundationalMyths, supra note 21, at 20-22.
29. Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2209.
30. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 75-87 (discussing the law's treatment of mothers and
motherhood).
31. Id. at 83; see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Legal Stories, Change and Incentives-Reinforcing
the Law of the Father, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 243-49 (1992) [hereinafter Law of the Father] (legislation
requiring presence of the father).
32. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 82-83 (stating that feminists undermined the acceptance
of mother as being something superior to the gender term "parent").
33. See ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1,at 32-33 (discussing such a system of property division).
34. Id. at 34.
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presumption of joint custody.35 For these feminists, it is imperative that the law
reflect society's aspirationsfor equality rather than remedy hardships caused by
existing (gendered) allocations of household labor. The rationale is that, for their
own good, all women must be directed to paid work and economic selfsufficiency. Of course, men are to be nudged into assuming their share of
domestic tasks. The belief was that by refusing to compensate or reward women
for choosing traditional domestic tasks over market work, women and,
36
correspondingly, men would change their priorities and behavior. The
motivation of these reformers is not punitive, but social engineering in the
interests of gender equality is clearly a paramount concern. The results of the
gender neutral, equality school of thought, however, is often a disadvantage to
37
women.
Liberal-feminist-equality motivations aside, a great deal of political
discussion about legal reforms is explicitly punitive in nature. There is much
discussion about ways to structure policy reform incentives against single
motherhood, whether single motherhood results from divorce or from women
having children outside of marriage.3
Indeed, some of the proposals for driving women back into the institution of
marriage, or preventing them from leaving it, seem overtly vindictive as well as
punitive. For example, politicians have suggested that children be taken from
39
single mothers and placed in orphanages. Some are more subtly coercive,
however, such as recent attempts to repeal no-fault divorce, thus impeding the
ability to exit from marital relationships. Harsh proposals directed at single
mothers such as the recent gutting of programs designed to aid poor families'°
with-children have received surprising general approval.

35. Id. at 80.
36. See id. at 27-28 (elaborating that feminists supported gender neutral custody reforms even though
they were conscious of the resulting disadvantage of the loss of maternal preference).
37. Id. at 29.
38. See generally Law of the Father, supra note 31, at 227-49 (discussing efforts to encourage
"traditional" families and increase men's roles in childrearing.
39. This was a favorite suggestion of Newt Gingrich. See Masking Dependency, supra note 10, at 2185
n.10.
40. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 110-18 (describing various proposals to prevent child
poverty).
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Whatever the motivation of reformers, the high divorce rates and the
statistics on reproductive, workplace and family behavior show that widesweeping and general, punitive measures enacted into law seem unlikely to cause
significant change in behavior. More powerful and compelling on a day-to-day
basis than the law, cultural and social forces drive the evolving changes in norms
concerning sexuality, reproduction and family formation at the end of this
millennium (or at the dawn of the new millennium). 4 ' Law seems a feeble and
inadequate tool for those who wish to challenge these emerging forms of family
and norms of individual behavior.
More realistic and pragmatic, and therefore more likely to have some
measurable effect, are reforms that, while seemingly changing expectations,
nonetheless ensure that old patterns prevail; paternal right and responsibility will
continue in a world in which the form of many families otherwise may not be
traditional. For example, joint custody and other shared parenting measures that
are designed to equalize biological fathers' rights to children regardless of their
marital status or demonstrated commitment to parenting can be (and have been)
justified as means to establish male ties to children that increase the assumption
of male responsibility for those children.42 Increased efforts and the introduction
of more invasive schemes to collect child support, 43 along with broadened use of
paternity proceedings for linking men to their nonmarital children, are other
examples of measures explicitly invoked to implement male responsibility
toward children."
Note that the concept of responsibility that informs the debates and
discussions of these and other efforts reflects the gendered norms of the
traditional patriarchal family-the male is clearly viewed as the economic
provider and as the disciplinarian for the family. Male ties to children are
biological, legal and economic. Also important, arguments about ensuring
paternal responsibility in the reconfigured family are accompanied by arguments
that it is essential to reestablish paternal control over children.4 ' The flip side of
paternal responsibility is paternal right and authority. What is fascinating is that
the inherently patriarchal project is accomplished within the framework of
equality. In fact, the proponents of the new manifestation of patriarchal power
use equality as the logic of their reforms.
The objective of reconstituting paternal responsibility and its corollary,
paternal right, outside of the traditional marital context has flourished in the
context of equality rhetoric in family law reform. This rhetoric has its roots in the

41. See id. at 145-50 (discussing changing views of intimacy within the family).
42. Id. at 138 n.68.
43. See Law of the Father, supra note 31, at 240-42 (elaborating on the Federal Support Act of 1988 and
its provisions for enforcing child support).
44. Id. at 237-47.
45. See Fineman, supra note 13, at 540-41 (indicating that traditional families are the best prevention for
child poverty).
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46

midcentury women's movement for legal or civil equality. One significant
feminist law reform effort sought to discourage formal gender classifications and
different treatment for women and men in the workplace and the political arena
as well as in families. This movement was successful and family law is now
formally gender neutral.47 In custody cases, this means that reference to or
explicit use of a preference for maternal custody for younger children is no
48
longer acceptable. Neither parent is to be advantaged (or disadvantaged) as a
result of her or his gender.49
In and of itself, a reform that removes explicit gender designations from
statutes and decisionmaking is not objectionable. In fact, it can be viewed as
desirable on a symbolic level, particularly if removal of gender has no negative
effect in terms of ultimate results in actual cases. In fact, it might be beneficial to
be clear about social policy in this important area. Laws could specifically
reiterate the desirability of adhering to and supporting those caretaking and
nurturing norms that historically underlie the maternal preference, yet express
them in contemporary, gender neutral terms. For example, we could consider the
paramount factor in custody determinations to be not the maternal preference,
but a preference for the parent who has undertaken responsibility for the ongoing
day-to-day care of the child or has demonstrated that she or he is most likely to
put the child's interests ahead of individual career demands. 0
The articulation of caretaking expectations outside of the cultural shorthand
of mother might have been (had the potential to be) productive and encouraging
of genuine reform. Yet the course of reform has been quite different. The quest
for gender neutrality in custody decisionmaking has proven to be too ambitious
and too singularly focused on equality to be satisfied with the mere imposition of
gender neutral language. Particularly in custody decisionmaking, the search has
also been for standards or decisional factors that are neutral in result as well as
expression. 5' Of particular concern (to the reformers) are those factors that are
deemed to favor mothers disproportionately, such as a preference for custody
with the primary caretaker.

46. At the turn of the century, family law reform was also related to women's push for equality.
Ironically, in attacking the rule of father custody, feminists of that era privileged motherhood by casting
caretaking as gendered work that is deserving of recognition in custody determinations. The success of our
foremothers in displacing the father's right and fostering maternal preferences for young children were explicit
targets of contemporary feminists seeking to enshrine a system of gender neutrality and equality primarily
focused on women's participation in the public sphere. NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 76-79.
47. ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 26-28.
48. Id.
49. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 88 (opining that "commitment to gender neutrality meant
the legal system had to eliminate any preferences based on a gender concept of motherhood").
50. It should be obvious that even in situations where both parents work, typically one assumes primary
responsibility for securing, organizing and supervising alternative care and is the one who steps in if glitches or
crises disrupt such arrangements.
51. ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 110-11.
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Reformers argue that because mothers are typically primary caretakers, a
preference for primary caretakers is an unacceptable gender bias in favor of
women." This is a classic disparate impact legal argument: the primary caretaker
standard would be said to have an adverse disparate impact on the custody
prospects of men." Thus, a nurturing standard cannot be used. 54 In its place are
what is deemed more neutral considerations, such as the quality of the respective
school districts of the parents or general assessments about which parent is more
likely to facilitate and support visitation by the other parent postdivorce.55 As one
court succinctly stated, "custody determinations must be born of gender neutral
precepts in both result and expression."56
A fetish for gender neutrality, particularly one that imports disparate impact
concepts from wholly unrelated areas of discrimination law to assess the
appropriateness of otherwise neutral rules, is inappropriate in the family area.
More is at stake in custody rules than an objective assessment of the relationship
and roles of women and men. Custody decisionmaking occurs within the context
of a legal system that has as its stated object custody determinations that are in
the best interest of the child.57 Given this mandate, it seems clear that the need
and welfare of the child, not the equality of the parents, should be the central
inquiry, and the measure with which to judge general rules and specific cases.
Therefore, it seems that the implementation of gender neutrality is likely to
actually prove harmful to children.
The obvious question is: how can we apply the best interest test without
considering and heavily valuing those things that specifically mothers
overwhelmingly (even if stereotypically) do with and for children? Nurturing and
caretaking-practices that are of primary importance to the rearing of childrenare heavily identified in our society with the practice of responsible mothering.
This cultural judgment is distinguishable from the economic expectations that
primarily define responsible fathering. What is the logic or the justice in the
position that women who live up to the expectations of motherhood (as well as
the men who mother) should be denied the reward (as well as the responsibility)
of continued custody and care of their children?
Why this obsession with gender neutrality? Many feminists paradoxically
justify the tendency to devalue the identification of women with mothering by
pointing to the need to use gender neutrality to secure women's equality with

52. See id. at 111-12 (analyzing the proposition in the context of the reformers use of social sciences).
53. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 82-83 (discussing the fathers rights movement's
strategies in reforming custody laws).
54. Id. at 83.
55. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 78-79 & nn.31-32 (discussing factors used to determine
child custody).
56. Linda R. v. Richard E., 561 N.Y.S.2d 29,33, 162 A.D.2d 48,54(1990).
57. Richard Collier, Waiting Till Father Gets Home, 4 Soc. & LEGAL STUDIES, 13 (1995); see also
ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 86-87.
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men in areas of life outside the family.58 Gender neutrality in one area is thus
considered to mandate it in all others. The demands of equality outside the family
are not only a backdrop but are a driving impulse for the legal system's
reassessment of the fairness or justice of rules favoring mothers and maternal
behavior in determining custody for children.
It is not considered problematic that, alongside feminist legal reform in the
direction of gender neutrality, the reestablishment of paternal right in the absence
of changed paternal behavior has also resulted in the devaluing of the practice
and the legally recognizable category of mothering. In fact, contemporary
discussions about the unfairness of rules that favor mothering often assume that
there have been extensive changes in parenting patterns that make fathering and
mothering more alike.59 There is little empirical evidence to support this
assumption (and some to refute it).60 The rhetoric of equality in this regard is a
rhetoric of assertion, aspiration and accusation.
According to this idealized notion of the new, egalitarian family, mothers no
longer formally assigned to separate spheres must be considered as equal to men
in their inclination and capacity to earn money and fathers must be considered
6
equal to women in their desire and ability to provide nurturance. ' If this ideal can
be made real, it follows that the law should facilitate and institutionalize
egalitarian social transformations by insisting on the ideal gender neutral
standard for parenthood. This argument concludes with a basic appeal to justice:
the perception that fathers, as a group, are unjustly discriminated against in the
family court system.62
Offered as proof of this claim are the statistics that indicate that only a small
63
percentage of fathers get custody of their children at divorce. These statistics
have been fleshed out by harrowing horror stories-accounts of men prevented
from seeing their children and unjustly treated by courts, lawyers and vindictive
custodial mothers. Testimonials to the unfairness of the entire process, some
more scholarly in nature and ambitious than others, are offered by the extensive
and prolific fathers' rights network. 64 The message is that men have lived up to
their paternal responsibilities, and have even changed their parenting behavior,
yet are unjustly treated as second-class parents. They deserve equal status with
mothers and protection from the excesses historically perpetuated by the custody

58. See ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 89 (asserting that liberal feminists urged that the
stereotyping of mothers "be discarded as irrelevant").
59. See generally Robert E. Salt, The Legal Rights of Fathers in the United States, in MEN'S CHANGING
ROLES IN THE FAMILY (Robert A. Lewis & Marvin B. Sussman, eds. 1986) (discussing men's rights regarding
the care and custody of their children).
60. See Collier, supra note 57, at 15-20 (describing the differences in the roles of father and mother,
utilizing case law from the United Kingdom).
61. NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 158.
62. See Salt, supra note 59, at 107-11 (discussing men and child custody).
63. See id. at 107 (asserting that men only get custody in 10-12% of cases).
64. Id. at 202-03; NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 119-22.
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and control monopoly over children that courts have given to mothers.
Such anecdotal and undocumented assertions have nevertheless changed the
way fatherhood is approached and articulated in the rules governing custody at
divorce. Fathers are increasingly seen as victims of an outmoded system of
stereotypes, justifying a call for restructuring of the custodial process in the
direction of conferring full equality upon fathers.6 ' Equality is best encouraged
through the implementation of a shared parenting of children after divorce thus
men are now more likely to get custody if they engage in a real contest.66 The real
gain for fathers, however, is in their ability to maintain significant postdivorce
control over day-to-day decisions regarding their children even when they do not
have primary responsibility for those children and can therefore evade the
consequences of such decisions. Consequently, fathers may opt for the right to
intercede--primary caretaking on the other hand, must consult and negotiate with
them-but fathers are not required to participate in the harder realities of
parenthood.
In an interesting rhetorical maneuver, this restructuring on behalf of fathers is
justified as being in the best interest of the child. 67 It is argued that extensive
contact with both parents postdivorce is essential to child development. 6' As a
result, the rights of the noncustodian are aligned with the needs of the child and,
thus, given ascendancy. Accordingly, the rules reflect a preference for custody
not in the most nurturing parent, but in the most generous parent: the one who is
most likely to facilitate extensive contact with the other parent postdivorce. 69
Further, generosity is accomplished and ensured by extensive monitoring and
supervision of the primary caretaking parent. For many advocates of paternal
equality, the new ideal can only be realized in a preference for joint custody.
Rather than justice and egalitarianism, the "degendered" custody rules
represent a perverse affirmative action scheme in which men are excused from
nurturing and caretaking norms and are permitted to continue to devote their
major energy and attention to their careers and extra-familial activities without
risking adverse consequences when they decide they want to assert claims to
control their children postdivorce. A basic biological connection is a sufficient tie
to the child in making a claim for shared custody and control rights-a right to
order that structure and equalize the postdivorce relationships between both
parents and their child. Nurturing is devalued, ignored and unrewarded in such a
scheme.

65. Id. at 82-83.
66. Id. at 82.
67. Id.; see also Collier, supra note 57, at 44 (examining custody determinations in contemporary
English case law).
68. See ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 81 (discussing the rhetoric of "helping professionals"
who declare that joint custody has psychological advantages for the child).
69. NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 119.
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Of course, part of the logic behind this approach to custody is that fathers
contribute in different ways to the well-being of their children. They provide
economically. Indeed, some argue that men should not be penalized postdivorce
merely because they were the primary economic provider for their children rather
than the primary caretaker or nurturer. The argument proceeds: of course the
assumption of the wage earner role often decreases the time and energy available
for caretaking. To overvalue the time and energy expended in caretaking in
assigning postdivorce responsibility and authority would provide an inequitable
windfall for the caretaker, unfairly advantaging her in the custody
.
determination 70
The basic asymmetry of this logic should be clear (though it is not apparent
to those making the argument). Any system disregarding caretaking because of a
desire to avoid penalizing the primary wage earner (equalizing his chances to
gain custody and/or retain control over children) risks ignoring the penalties
already suffered by the parent who has been the primary caretaker. The time and
energy devoted to caretaking does in fact decrease and detract from opportunities
to invest in individual market skills and participate in market activity. This was
the argument used by fathers' rights proponents to argue that it would be unfair
to privilege caretaking. The sacrifice to individual development seems to be
conceded. Should we further deprive the caretaker of the benefits of her nonmarket work-the caretaking she has invested--by denying her custody and
control over her children? More accurately, should we further burden the primary
caretaker by forcing her to negotiate, cajole and console the noncaretaking parent
after divorce because she continues to be tied to him in a shared parenting
scheme?
My point is that provision of economic benefits to the family does not have
the same implications and consequences in the postdivorce world, as does the
provision of caretaking. A caretaker may compromise or forgo altogether skill
development that will add to their resumes, culminate in enhanced marketable
skills and improved economic position. Economic contribution to children's
welfare, by contrast, results from market activity that improves one's skills and
stature in the market; this self-investment is not the equivalent of the investment
in others involved in caretaking. The trade-offs are not the same.
The investment in children in the form of caretaking has adverse effects on
development of market skills.7 Even if a mother does work, she compromises her
market position by assuming primary responsibility for her children.7" There are
risks associated with everyday events like illness or failures in childcare
arrangements that necessitate missing work or establishing more flexible

70. This argument is made each year by at least one student in my family law class.
71. See Cracking the FoundationalMyths, supra note 21, at 20-21.
72. See id. at 21 (discussing the incompatibility of the caretaking responsibilities on the caretaker's
career marketability).
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(therefore more tangential) connections with the workplace.73 These
responsibilities are typically assigned within a family to only one parent (usually
the one with the lowest wage earning potential, generally the woman). And, lest
the anti-essentialist rhetoric totally obscure appreciation for elementary biology,
we must take into account that pregnancy and childbirth, as well as breastfeeding, are female functions that may temporarily affect the physical and
emotional resources available for other endeavors.74 These are gendered factors
that have serious economic implications. Nonetheless, custody debates do not
explicitly address these implications but instead, through the imposition of the
equality model, treat caretaking and economic support as equivalent sacrifices
and contributions to the family.
In addition to this basic justice point, a social engineering argument can be
made. Equating care and economic contribution perpetuates the very behavior
that equality advocates seek to change. If, because caretaking is devalued, men
can leave the marriage relationship with the future benefits gained by their
investment in themselves intact, as well as realize the benefits of their wife's
investment in the marital children, why should they change their behavior? They
are not penalized for failing to sacrifice personal (career or market skill)
development or advancement to care for children. 7' Through the assertion of
neutrality and equality, they are thus free to continue the traditional male
preoccupation 76 with the workplace and marketplace, with someone else's labor
making it possible for them to also have children without risking loss of control
or paternal authority should divorce occur.
Why have the arguments evolved in this way? Certainly, as has already been
demonstrated, the power of equality ideology is central, but it is certainly not
typical that policymakers and legislators adopt feminist perspectives. Less
symbolic justifications also have been at work. One very effective argument for
increasing the rights and control of noncustodial fathers has been that this will
ensure compliance with child support orders. 7 The fact that child support enters
into the picture as an influential factor in the context of divorce is not unexpected
in a society in which payment of child support is the exception and not the

73. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 166 (describing caretaking conflicts faced by working
mothers).
74. See id. at 48 (acknowledging that men and women have different experiences).
75. See Collier, supra note 57, at 22 (describing the emergent family man or detached father as "marked
by all the trappings of a benign and safe/domesticated masculinity--a masculinity pervaded by the dualism of a
public/private divide which legitimated his absence from childcare whilst simultaneously maintaining the
structural supports whence he derived his economic power").
76. The traditional male preoccupation with the workplace has also been characterized as "breadwinner
masculinity." Men are seen as the economic provider and women are seen as the caretaker. The law sanctions
the philosophy of male physical absence from the family in order to make money. Id. at 15-16.
77. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 119 & n.68 (citing David Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM.
L.Q. 345 (1979)) (stating that "[t]here is also evidence that joint legal custody makes default on child support
payments less likely").
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norm. 78 But the nature and source of these arguments are colorable. Economic
irresponsibility is excused and justified by fathers' rights groups who argue that
men's widespread failure to pay child support is attributable to the frustration and79
parents.
pain they experience as a result of their unjust treatment as second-class
Overwhelmingly, male policy bodies have accepted this argument and assume
that divorced fathers have a basic good will and a natural inclination toward
responsible behavior. This argument prevails in spite of substantial statistical
evidence to the contrary.
What has been missing from policy and reform discussions thus far is a
debate about the nature of fatherhood and the transformation of the role of the
father in response to changing expectations, norms and practices. How does the
desire for gender neutrality and the ideal of egalitarianism play a role in the
creation of a new set of norms for fatherhood? Men should be engaged in this
type of rhetorical and conceptual exercise, following the consciousness-raising
and conversational models of the last few decades through which women
successfully transformed their roles.8" The focus in much of contemporary
fathers' rights discourse, however, has, concentrated almost exclusively on
perceived failings of mothers and their alleged vindictiveness and
irresponsibility. The strategy is successful and failures of fathers are turned back
on mothers. Male foibles are thus cast as merely responsive to women's actions
and are understandably defensive.
For example, a sense of crisis for fathers has been generated concerning
visitation rights.8 ' The assertion of fathers' rights groups is that mothers typically
persist in interfering with fathers' access to children. There are suggestions that,
in retaliation, these mothers should be subject to fines and/or imprisonment or
loss of custody8 2 Fathers' rights groups also allege that mothers misuse child
support payments; speculation exists that mothers use their meager and sporadic
child support awards to support vile habits or to indulge new lovers.8 3 These
undocumented accusations receive media and legislative attention and have
prompted suggestions for invasive reforms such as mandatory yearly accounting.
A substantial amount of fathers' rights discourse characterizes mothers in
negative and malicious stereotypes, arguing for monitoring, punishment,
containment and control over mothers. 84 Such rhetoric is premised on the false
assumption that mothers can exercise rights in their children only at the expense
of others. Every step to benefit custodial mothers is perceived as causing
78. ILLUSION OF EQUALITY, supra note 1, at 68.
79. Id. at 88 & n.23.
80. See generally Collier, supra note 58 (analyzing how the law has constructed fatherhood); see also
Ralph LaRossa, The Culture and Conduct of Fatherhood, in FAMILIES IN THE U.S.: KINSHIP & DOMESTIC
POLICIES 377-85 (Karen V. Hansen, et al., eds., 1998) (describing the "mechanics" of fatherhood).
81. NEUTERED MOTHER,.supra note 12, at 202.
82. See id. (describing proposals to keep mothers "in check").
83. Id.
84. Id.
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potential harm to someone else, fathers in particular, but often also to those same
children.
Another strain of fathers' rights rhetoric, not as overtly hostile to mothers, is
associated with the historical exclusion of some men from many of society's
rewards and privileges because of their race, class or ethnicity."5 While this
discourse does not conceptualize the problem as a loss of men's traditional
privileged position in the family, it still indulges in the assumption that it is
imperative to restore fathers to their mythic position as "head" of the household.86
In this discourse, fatherhood represents "a window into the 'real' or hard issues
of unemployment. 8 7 It is argued that "[flathers must have access to jobs and
training programs in order to 'be' fathers .... Once again, here the essential
nature of fatherhood is not found in caretaking, but rather in economic provision.
These arguments resort to images of traditional patriarchy in an attempt to
persuade the dominant culture of the need for economic justice for this class of
fathers. In fact, it is considered problematic if mothers are economically
independent of fathers through provision of state resources to single mothers or
because the mothers earn wages themselves. Economically independent women
are seen as taking over the male role. Some of the rhetoric of civil rights
organizations has gone so far as to suggest that "[b]lack women, particularly as
single mothers, emasculate [b]lack men, and that women in general are incapable
of raising sons."' 9 Even when sympathetic to women, the discourse is
paternalistic and patriarchal.90
Both strains of fathers' rights discourse are based on notions of traditional
male right and position. 9' Neither has any conceptual difficulty with the
reactionary assertion that the welfare of children is primarily and largely
dependent upon society treating men better and reigning in women who have
exceeded their family authority. The emerging social reality of single mother is
either ignored or provokes punitive measures that we justify as necessary for men
to assume their appropriate roles and actually perform as the heads of families.
Many of the arguments made about paternal right and responsibility in regard
to children concerning custody determinations are also made in the nonmarital
85. Id. at 203-04.
86. This is reflected in legislative initiatives such as North Carolina's "Helping Dads" program, which
focuses on incarcerated and low-income fathers. The mission statement of the program equates economic
provision with positive fathering stating that "[b]eing a good dad starts with being a good provider." Press
Release, North Carolina:Helping Dads Initiative, at http://www.dhhs.state.nc.us\docs\fathers.htm (last visited
June 3, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
87. NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 204.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. For example, legislative initiatives such as one in New Jersey that aims to have a "father" on
every birth certificate seems to assume that women cannot survive without a male economic provider. Governor
Christine Todd Whitman, remarks at Second National Summit on Fatherhood (June 15, 1998), at
http://www.state.nj.us/govemor/father.html (last visited June 3, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
91. Id.
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context. 92 In recent years, unwed fathers' claims to custody and visitation have
strengthened significantly. In contrast to the patina of parental equality in the
discourse concerning divorce, however, fatherhood in the welfare context is
almost exclusively and most explicitly about how to enforce male economic
responsibility. 93
Paternal responsibility, the argument goes, can be manifested either by
marriage to-and subsequent support of the mother of one's children (considered
the preferable method)-or through admission of paternity and subsequent
payment of child support to the single mother-child unit. 94 There is no prolonged
discussion of the nurturing father in the welfare context. In fact, the rhetoric
indulges in the viability of traditional family role differentiation--4he assumption
is that the women can adequately take care of children only within the context of
marriage, with men providing economically. 95
The welfare debates also contain a powerful attack on mothers. Single
mothers at divorce and in the welfare context are cast as incompetent and
96
potentially dangerous to their children and to society at large. Divorcing
mothers, however, are not demonized to the same degree as are the stereotypical
unwed mothers of welfare discourse.97 In the debates concerning welfare, many
commentators have explicitly condemned women who are single mothers and
insisted that these women, in deviating from the ideal family form, are
responsible for social ills and the poverty afflicting their children. 98 According to
this logic, it is the fundamental deviation from the norm of the traditional or
marital family and not the ultimate economic deprivation that is responsible for
the problems single mothers face. This is a convenient position for those who
want to avoid the necessity of providing real welfare provisions and guaranteeing
a minimal standard of living for children in this society.
As exemplified in 1990 by Senator Daniel Moynihan's designation of broken
(single mother) families as the source of social pathologies, 99 welfare policy
reformers equate the crisis in the family with the disintegration of society. This
view has dominated policy discussions. Moynihan astonishingly displaced the
economic crisis with a moral one, asserting that the dilemma in which poor
families found themselves was not fundamentally economic, but rather
attributable to the behavior (or, more accurately, the misbehavior or

92. See generally Law of the Father,supra note 31 (setting forth efforts to increase men's roles in the
family through legislation).
93. See NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 113 (stating that men are "economically essential" to
their children).
94. Id. at 211.
95. Id. at 213.
96. Id. at 104.
97. Id. at 102.
98. Id. at 104.
99. CONG. REC. S14416-11417 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1990); NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 113.
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irresponsibility) of parents who reproduce outside of the institution of marriage. 1°
An even more strident example of the misplacement of responsibility for
economic and social inequality on the individual is found in the work of Charles
Murray who casts illegitimacy as the single most important social problem of our
time-more important than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, welfare or
homelessness-because it drives everything else.'"' The proposed solution for
these evils, he argues, is marriage: the provision of male economic and
disciplinary responsibility and control to supplement and save the single mother
family.'o 2
The work of more liberal commentators has reflected the desire to ensure the
dominance of marriage and the belief in the necessary complementariness of the
distinct social roles of mother and father. William Galston, an influential Clinton
advisor, had patriarchal dimensions to his policy arguments. Galston has asserted
that the state should not be value-neutral but rather should pursue policies that
validate and strengthen traditional marriage. '0'Galston's suggestion that the state
create incentives to strengthen marriage wrongly presupposes that only one
family form can provide a strong society.
Galston equates poverty with single parent status (although many of the poor
are married) and recommends marriage as the cure for poverty.' °4 Further,
Galston ignores the fact that "stable" marriage means that women are often
dependent on men and often suffer power inequality and various degrees of
domination by men, both in and outside the home.' 5
Perhaps the most interesting feature of both the liberal and conservative
welfare context arguments against single motherhood and for reestablishment of
a marriage-based family ethic is the conflation of family form with economic
consequences. The likelihood of any family, regardless of form, escaping poverty
and raising law-abiding citizens is related to the economic, social and community
resources it has available. It is nonsense to believe that only the traditional family
provides mechanisms for avoiding poverty and other social ills. One need only
look to the example of European countries where there are viable social goods
provided by the state, such as health care, day care, child allowances, housing
and a guarantee of a basic income. These viable social goods are effective
mechanisms for avoiding poverty and other social ills. As a result, even when
European
countries
have
high
rates
of
nonmarital
births, they have far less crime and poverty than we have in the United States. In
Sweden, for example, the typical child is born in a nonmarital family, yet social

100.

NEUTERED MOTHER, supra note 12, at 101.

101.

Charles Murray, The Coming White 'Underclass', WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1993, at A14.

102.

Id.

103.

See Iris Marion Young, Mothers, Citizenship and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values,

ETHICS, Apr. 1995, at 535 (critiquing Galston's Liberal Purposes).
104. Id. at 285
105. Id. at 20.
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status and economic destiny are not determined by the marital status of one's
mother.
The United States has never had a real welfare state, a structure in which the
collective national community ensures basic entitlements for all its members as
individual citizens independent of the form of family in which they live. In the
United States the private family, not the public state, is primarily responsible for
the dependency of children, the ill and the elderly, which eclipses the need for
consideration of a collective responsibility.'0 6 Ideally, the private family is
assumed to operate independent of the state and of the market in fulfilling its
caretaking responsibilities.' 7 This independence, however, is not accomplished
unless the family is able to produce both economic support and caretaking labor.
Typically these tasks are allocated among family members and are historically
distributed along gendered lines."" Men have not begun to seriously revise the
fatherhood ideal in part because it still serves an important ideological and policy
function for a society in which dependency is privatized.
As this last insight indicates, changing the historic division of labor within
the family will necessitate recasting our societal expectations for fatherhood so
that it is more than just an economic relationship with the family. It will also
require transformation of the workplace and a revisioning of the role of
government in ensuring family-friendly public institutions. °9 We cannot think of
important areas of activity that profoundly affect the family as differentiated,
public spheres (market or government), segregated out and with little or no
responsibility for dependency.
The fact that there has been so little adjustment in market or governmental
structures to facilitate and foster attempts to make the family more egalitarian is a
major impediment to change. If one were interested in real reform, there are a
few areas in which substantial reassessment and reevaluation might be
undertaken. First and foremost, it seems necessary to consider the roles of men as
husbands and fathers in an egalitarian world."0 In doing so, there will of course

106. Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 21, at 20-22.
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id.
109. Even the most liberal government initiatives that recognize the social significance of male/female
roles simply recognize the roles-they do not offer a framework for change, but simply make broad abatements.
See Colorado Initiative for Responsible Fatherhood, http://www.peak.org/-jedwards/COLORADO.HTM (last
visited Aug. 26, 2001) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) which states:
To support fatherhood Colorado must:
Recognize the need and moral right of children to know and meaningfully interact with both
their parents as they grow up.
Hold fathers morally, emotionally and financially responsible for the welfare of their children.
Recognize that a father's involvement in his child's life is multi-faceted.
Provide role models of responsible fathering/male behavior.
Accept fathers' roles in the home just as women are accepted in the work place.
110. See generally Collier, supra note 57 (describing changing male roles).
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be substantial implications for the roles they now occupy within the public
sphere.
Bringing men into the debate in this way will make it obvious that it is
necessary to tear down the walls erected between family, state and market and
realize that all are mutually contingent. As our current policy rhetoric proceeds,
in constructing independent spheres, we limit and confine the obligation,
responsibility, operation and authority of others. What is needed is integration. If
we recognize that people have a right to work, but also recognize that workers
are also family members and that we want to families to be the primary location
to handle dependency-care for children and others incapable of caring for
themselves-it seems clear that as a society we have to develop policies directing
workplaces to facilitate caregiving.
It is naive to think that transformation in the family will not necessitate some
complementary restructuring of workplace and increased participation on the part
of government."' Government and market in combination must remove the
obstacles and burdens associated with combining caretaking and paid work that
have grown up around an antiquated, unrealistic model of the family in which
there was a caretaker who complemented the wage earner."'
The new workplace norm should be that of the dually responsible worker.
The question would become: How can we ensure the caretaker's right to workher right to earn and not sacrifice the well-being of her children or other
dependants by doing so? The market must be transformed. If it does not
transform on its own, the government must structure family-friendly policies into
the workplace. This can be accomplished through regulation or through
incentives offered by the tax system. The list of proposals may be long and
details will be vexing, but, at a minimum, proposals should include paid family
leave for all workers, flexible workweeks and subsidized child care facilities, in
which the workers are decently paid.
The point is that in making the facilitation of nurturing and caretaking a
central responsibility of the nonfamily arenas of life, we structure an equal
opportunity to engage in nurturing and caretaking. Under these circumstances,
men may actually be more likely to take time and energy from their market
careers to invest in nurturing families. And, if they do not, at least it will be clear
that they have made a free choice to forego nurturing-a choice unfettered by
institutional constraints. They can then justly be held to the consequences of that
choice when it comes time to decide who has earned the custody of children or
the right to demand social subsidy for caretaking work. In this way,
establishment of a dually responsible norm will have the advantage of lessening
the cases where women are punished in the market for caretaking responsibilities
in the home.

111. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, CHI.-KENT L. REV., forthcoming 2001.
112. Cracking the Foundational Myths, supra note 21, at 25-26.
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Women's roles within families and in relation to the marketplace have
undergone tremendous changes over the past several decades. The expectation is
that women will work in the market and continue to perform in the home. This
expectation is enforced through gender neutral family laws and an accompanying
explicit set of expectations that women are responsible for their own and their
children's economic well-being either postdivorce or if they do not marry.
Expectations about men have not been so transformed. In part, this is because
we value the economic over the nurturing. There are no corresponding sets of
individually applicable rules to complement our expectations that women be
economically sufficient and mandate that men be responsible for nurturing.
Moreover, families bear the burdens of dependency while market institutions are
free to operate as though domestic tasks that reproduce the society were some
other institution's responsibility.' 3 Instead of making more concessions to the
unequal state of affairs that has resulted from this explicit ordering of priorities,
my suggestion is that we forgo attempts to coax men into caretaking and require
all social institutions to assume some responsibility for the needs of caretakers.
Instead of structuring incentives for men to act responsibly, we should worry
about the double burdens that have been foisted on mothers and seek to make it
possible for them to meet the conflicting demands society is extracting. This will
require substantial societal reordering, but when caretakers have the means to
meet the demands of those for whom they have assumed responsibility, the entire
society, including our children, will benefit.

113. See generally Masking Dependency, supra note 10 (discussing the burdens of dependents and their
impact on women's contributions to the marketplace).
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